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Abstract
In this paper I present a model in which production requires two types of labor
inputs: regular productive tasks and organizational capital, which is accumulated
by workers performing organizational tasks. By allocating more workers from orga-
nizational to productive tasks, ￿rms can temporarily increase production without
hiring. The availability of this intensive margin of labor adjustment, in combina-
tion with adjustment costs along the extensive margin (search frictions, ￿ring costs,
training costs), makes it optimal to delay employment adjustments. Simulations
indicate that this mechanism is quantitatively important even if only a small frac-
tion of workers perform organizational tasks, and explains why the hiring rate is
persistent and why employment is slow to recover after the end of a recession.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Employment is strongly procyclical, but lags output by one to two quarters over the
business cycle. This fact has received relatively little attention in the academic literature,
but has recently been important in the policy debate. In the booms after the 1991 and
2001 recessions, which have become known as ‘jobless recoveries’, it took 14 and 29
months respectively for employment to return to the level it was at the end of the
recession.1 This paper addresses the question why employment is slow to recover after
a recession by providing an explanation for why it may not be optimal for ﬁrms to start
hiring immediately after an increase in productivity.
I present a model of labor demand, in which production requires the input of two
types of tasks. Of all employed workers, most but not all work on activities directly
related to current production, say the assembly line. The remaining workers perform
other duties, which I label organizational tasks: oiling the machines, bookkeeping, qual-
ity control or cleaning up the factory hall. Organizational tasks do not directly inﬂuence
production but increase the stock of organizational capital, which enters in the produc-
tion function.
Firms can use organizational capital to ‘store’ labor, which provides them with an
intensive margin of labor adjustment. In combination with adjustment costs along the
extensive margin (search frictions, ﬁring costs, training costs), the availability of an
intensive margin of adjustment makes it optimal to delay employment adjustments.
Suppose that the number of employees in a ﬁrm is initially at its desired level when
productivity increases. Because the marginal product of an extra worker has gone
up, ﬁrms would like to increase production by employing more workers to take full
advantage of the increase in productivity. But because there are costs associated with
hiring more workers, ﬁrms may use the intensive margin of adjustment instead. By
allocating more workers from organizational tasks to productive activities (making the
mechanic, bookkeeper, assistant manager and janitor help out on the assembly line),
ﬁrms can temporarily increase production without hiring extra workers. But after a
while the fact that there is too little time to perform organizational tasks starts to hurt
production (the machines are no longer lubricated, no new supplies have been ordered
and the factory hall becomes a mess). Even if initially it was not optimal to pay the
adjustment costs and hire extra workers, it may eventually become optimal to do so.
This story depends on three important ingredients of the model. First, ﬁrms have
an incentive to postpone employment adjustments. Adjustment costs in combination
with discounting provide this incentive: by postponing the adjustment costs, these costs
are lower from today’s perspective.2 Second, there is an alternative margin of labor
adjustment available. This margin is provided by organizational capital which enters in
the production function and is substitutable for regular labor input. Third, using the
intensive margin of adjustment is initially costless but eventually costly. This property
is driven by two assumptions: reallocating workers within the ﬁrm is costless, and
organizational tasks do not enter directly in the production function but not performing
1All employees in the private sector, BLS Current Employment Statistics (establishment survey).
2If there is uncertainty about future productivity shocks, the ‘option value of waiting’ provides a
second reason to postpone the adjustment costs. Uncertainty strengthens, but is not crucial for the
results.
2these tasks gradually depletes the organizational capital stock.
The idea that organization is important for production has been used to explain
a range of phenomena in macroeconomics: the common growth rate across ﬁrms of
diﬀerent sizes (Prescott and Visscher 1980), the large decline in output in transition
economies (Blanchard and Kremer 1997) and the increase in the discrepancy between
the stock market value of ﬁrms and the value of their installed capital (Hall 2000a).
Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) present evidence that production, in addition to
capital and labor, depends on intangible assets like skills, organizational structures and
culture. They also ﬁnd that investments in these intangible assets are often large and
provide beneﬁts over very long horizons. All of these papers focus on complementaries
between organizational capital and physical capital or labor. But if organizational cap-
ital enters in a standard production function, it is not only complementary to but to
some degree also substitutable for other inputs. In this paper I focus on substitution
between organizational capital and labor.
Organization requires labor input: infrequent productive activities other than those
directly related to current production. Examples are machine maintenance and employee
training. In law ﬁrms, in busy times every hour worked is charged to a particular client
but when there is not much work lawyers write hours as ‘non-billable’. Another example
is a screening task as in Prescott and Visscher (1980) that ﬁr m su s et ol e a r ni nw h a t
type of tasks a worker is most productive in order to optimally organize the production
process.
Because organizational tasks generate lasting beneﬁts, these tasks can be postponed
when the productivity of current production is relatively high. Faced with temporarily
high productivity or product demand, hiring more workers may therefore not be the
only or even the ﬁrst thing a ﬁrm does. Instead, it may postpone the replacement of
an old machine, cancel a training session for its employees, or ask its workers to work
longer hours for a few months. Conversely, a period of relatively low productivity is a
good time to catch up with all of these things or to complete a reorganization of the
production line rather than an immediate reason to let go some employees. One compo-
nent of the intensive margin of adjustment are hours worked per employee.3 Contrary to
employment, hours per worker do not lag but lead output, providing some evidence that
ﬁrms indeed use the intensive margin before using the extensive margin of adjustment.
If adjustment costs in employment are non-convex, as in Bentolila and Bertola (1990)
or Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997), it is optimal for ﬁrms not to respond to
small shocks in the desired labor force, but to ‘hoard’ labor so long as the actual number
of workers does not deviate too much from the desired level. Thus, the ﬁrm prevents
making irreversible adjustments in case the shock is reversed. In response to a large
shock (or a sequence of small shocks) workers are hired or ﬁr e dt ok e e pt h ed i ﬀerence
between actual and desired employment within certain bounds. In the model with orga-
nizational capital, this type of adjustment costs may make it optimal to postpone rather
than forego employment adjustments. Firms face a trade-oﬀ between postponing the
adjustment costs and postponing employment adjustment. The gains from adjusting
employment are initially small because the ﬁr mc a na b s o r bp a r to ft h es h o c kb yr e a l -
3In fact, hours per worker are often referred to as the intensive margin, e.g. King and Rebelo (1999).
Here I think of sending workers home early so that they get rested as one of several infrequent tasks
that contribute to the organizational capital stock in the ﬁrm.
3locating workers within the ﬁrm, focusing on tasks directly related to production and
postponing organizational tasks. But these gains increase as workers spend less time
doing organizational tasks which leads to a reduction in their productivity in the long
run.
Unlike in most models with non-convex adjustment costs, the gist of this result
carries over to the case when adjustment costs are convex. With convex adjustment costs
small adjustments are not irreversible and there is no reason to postpone employment
adjustments. There is however, an incentive to adjust employment slowly because large
adjustments quickly grow very costly. Because slow adjustments are basically costless,
in the long run the model with convex adjustment costs reaches the frictionless optimal
allocation of labor. But in the short run, if the adjustment costs are suﬃciently high
the model behaves essentially as if employment is ﬁxed. In response to an increase in
productivity, ﬁrms use the intensive margin of adjustment. As the stock of organizational
capital is gradually depleted, the need to hire more workers becomes more urgent and
hiring increases. The higher urgency justiﬁes the higher adjustment costs necessary to
adjust employment at a faster rate. Eventually, after a period of hiring has increased
the employment level enough that the need for more workers becomes less urgent again,
hiring falls back to zero. But because hiring is initially increasing, it reaches its highest
level a while after productivity increased.
These dynamics are very diﬀerent from those of standard models with convex ad-
justment costs. In a model with convex adjustment costs but no organizational capital,
hiring jumps to its highest level immediately following an increase in productivity. In the
organizational capital model this eﬀect is counteracted by another eﬀect. Immediately
after the shock, the intensive margin of adjustment is still available and only when that
margin gets exhausted does the need for hiring reach its peak. Depending on the model
parameters, the combination of the two eﬀects can deliver a monotonically decreasing
impulse response for hiring like in the standard model or a hump-shaped response. The
model behaves as if there were adjustment costs not in employment but in the hiring
rate.
To explore the quantitative relevance of this mechanism, I extend the simple model
to a full dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. I then simulate this model and
compare its predictions to a standard real business cycle model. The main problems
in the real business cycle literature are that the model does not generate enough am-
pliﬁcation and propagation of productivity shocks (King and Rebelo 1999). One way
to understand these problems is that in the standard model there is only one channel
to substitute consumption for leisure in times of low productivity: intertemporal sub-
stitution through the capital accumulation decision. This poses strong restrictions on
the joint movement of employment, consumption and output (Hall 1997, 1999). Sev-
eral papers have modiﬁed the basic model to address these problems. Extending the
model with an alternative use of time that workers can substitute for market labor,
like home production (Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright 1991) or job search (Hall 1995),
helps to build in more ampliﬁcation. Adjustment costs in employment help to build
more propagation into the model (Cogley and Nason 1995).
In this paper I show that a combination of organizational capital and adjustment
costs not only improves the model along those dimensions, but also provides an ex-
planation why employment lags output over the business cycle and generates impulse
4responses that are consistent with evidence on persistence in the employment growth.
Organizational capital provides a way for ﬁrms to substitute current productive tasks for
organizational activities when productivity is relatively low. And because organizational
capital is accumulable, the production function is non-time-separable in organizational
labor, which gives rise to persistence in the hiring rate. In that sense the role of orga-
nizational capital is very similar to a model with nonseparable preferences over leisure
(Kydland and Prescott 1982, Hall 1991). The diﬀerence is that the eﬀect of organiza-
tional capital works on the demand side of the labor market and not through general
equilibrium wage ﬂuctuations. The model in this paper is also related to Hall’s (2000b)
model of recessions as reorganizations, which considers reorganization along the exten-
sive margin (workers quitting to ﬁnd a better job).
A third way to introduce nonseparabilities in production is a signal extraction frame-
work in which ﬁrms are uncertain about whether the recession has ended. Demers (1991)
analyzes a model with uncertainty about the state of demand, in which a ﬁrm updates
its beliefs as information becomes available over time, in combination with irreversibil-
ity of investments in physical capital. He ﬁnds that this leads to gradual adjustment
of the capital stock similar to convex adjustment costs in investment. In the context of
a search model, Pries (2002) shows that if workers and ﬁrms are uncertain about the
quality of their match, the hazard rate for match destruction decreases over time as
production realizations reveal information about the match quality. Formalizing Hall’s
(1995) idea that recessions are followed by prolonged periods of increased job loss, Pries
shows that learning about match quality implies that the unemployment rate remains
high for a long time after a sharp negative shock to employment. The diﬀerence between
these explanations and the one in this paper is that the organizational capital model
does not depend crucially on uncertainty. Delays in adjustment predicted by the model
with organizational capital are forecastable and are optimal even in a deterministic
environment.
The next section lays out the basic model, which I keep as simple as possible in
order to focus on the impact of organizational capital. In that section I also solve
for the optimal allocation of labor between tasks in the absence of adjustment costs.
Sections 3 and 4 present the analytical results for this model with non-convex and
convex adjustment costs in employment respectively. I then turn to the quantitative
importance of organizational capital for employment ﬂuctuations. In section 5, I present
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with organizational capital and discuss
how well it matches stylized facts about ﬂuctuations in aggregate employment over the
business cycle. I show that this model can replicate the persistence in employment and
the autocorrelation pattern between employment and output better than a standard
real business cycle model and slightly better than a model with convex adjustment
costs in employment. Section 6 looks at impulse response functions and shows that the
persistence in employment in the organizational capital model is generated by persistence
in employment growth. The response of hiring is quite diﬀerent from a model with only
adjustment costs in employment and consistent with evidence on persistence in the
worker ﬂo w sa n dt h eh i r i n gr a t e . T h er e s p o n s eo fe m p l o y m e n tr e s s e m b l e saj o b l e s s
recovery. Section 7 summarizes the conclusions.
52 A simple model with organizational capital
I consider the proﬁt maximization decision of a representative ﬁrm that employs a frac-
tion N of the workers in the economy, taking the wage w as given. Business cycles
are driven by unanticipated and permanent changes in productivity, which are the only
source of shocks in the economy. Only the production technology is non-standard be-
cause organizational capital enters into the production function. The partial equilibrium
model described in this section is the simplest possible setup, which I use to illustrate
the main results of the paper in sections 3 and 4.
2.1 Production technology
Production requires the input of two types of tasks. Of the total number of N employed
workers, a fraction h works on activities directly related to current production, say the
assembly line. The remaining workers perform organizational tasks, which increase the
stock of organizational capital. Production depends both on current labor input hN
and on the organizational capital stock L. For simplicity, the production function is
assumed to be additively separable and to have the same degree of diminishing returns
in both inputs,4
Y = Pf(hN)+f (L) (1)
where Y is production of the consumption good and P is the productivity of current
productive activities relative to organizational capital. Because there is no physical
capital in the model, I assume that f (.) is strictly increasing with decreasing returns to
scale, f0 > 0 and f00 < 0, so that there are diminishing returns in total eﬀective labor
input.
With a fraction h of all employed workers allocated to current production, there are
(1 − h)N workers available for organizational tasks. Organizational tasks do not enter
directly in the production function, but production depends on the stock of organiza-
tional capital L, which is accumulated by workers performing organizational tasks by
the following the law of motion.
˙ L = δ [(1 − h)N − L] (2)
where δ>0 is the depreciation rate of organizational capital. In speciﬁcation (2), L
converges to (1 − h)N in the long run if the number of workers assigned to organizational
tasks is constant. But if this number changes to a permanently higher or lower level, L
moves to this new level only gradually.
The depreciation parameter δ measures how often organizational tasks have to be
performed to keep the organizational capital stock at a constant level. A higher value for
δ makes the eﬀect of organizational activities wear oﬀ faster, and makes organizational
capital more similar to regular labor input. For δ →∞the formulation nests the case
where there are two types of tasks required for production, but both are directly related
to current production, i.e. L =( 1 − h)N, in which case the production function is
time-separable.
4The second assumption is inconsequential, see section 3.4.
62.2 Adjustment technology
In response to a change in P, ﬁrms may want to change the allocation of workers
between current productive and organizational activities, as well as the overall level
of employment in the ﬁrm. Reallocating workers to diﬀerent tasks within the ﬁrm is
costless, but there are costs associated with adjusting the total number of employees. I
denote these costs by a cost function φ(dN),w i t hφ(0) = 0,w h i c hﬁrms have to pay
out of their revenues.
In section 3, I consider ﬁxed adjustment costs of the form φ(dN)=φ>0 if dN > 0
or dN < 0 and φ(dN)=0only if dN =0 . This cost function (just like proportional
adjustment costs or any combination of ﬁxed and proportional costs) is non-convex in
zero and therefore displays irreversibility in the sense that the adjustment costs cannot
be recovered by reversing the adjustment. In sections 4 and 5, the cost function is
of the form φ(n)=1
2φn2 where dN = ndt. Because this function is convex in zero,
inﬁnitesimally small adjustments in employment are costless and therefore reversible.
For convenience, I assume that the adjustment costs are costs associated with chang-
ing the number of employees in the ﬁrm, not hiring and ﬁring costs. The diﬀerence is
that I assume it is costless to ﬁre a worker and replace her with another. Because of
this assumption the labor market is perfectly competitive even with non-convex adjust-
ment costs. In the presence of non-convex hiring or ﬁring costs, a worker would have
bargaining power after she is hired.
2.3 Proﬁt maximization
Proﬁt maximization is not a static problem because the production function depends
on organizational capital and is therefore not time-separable. The representative ﬁrm
chooses a path of employment adjustments dN and the fraction of workers assigned to
current production h to maximize the net present value its proﬁts, taking the wage w
as given.




e−rt[Y − Nw− φ(dN)]dt (3)
where Y is aggregate production as in (1), φ(dN) are the adjustment costs in employ-
ment and r is the interest rate, subject to the law of motion for organizational capital
(2) and the constraints 0 <h<1 and 0 <N<1.
2.4 Frictionless optimum
A sab e n c h m a r k ,i ti su s e f u lt os o l v et h eﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem when
adjustment costs are zero. Without adjustment costs, ﬁr m sc a ns e te m p l o y m e n tt oi t s
desired level at every point in time and N is a choice variable in addition to h.V a l u e
function (3) satisﬁes the Bellman equation,
rV ∗ (L;P)=m a x
h,N
{Pf(hN)+f (L) − Nw+ δ [(1 − h)N − L]V ∗
L} (4)
where V ∗ denotes the value of the ﬁrm in the frictionless case and V ∗
L is the derivative of
that value function with respect to the state variable L or the shadowprice of a higher
organizational capital stock.
7The ﬁrst order conditions for h and N, state that the marginal product of one extra
worker in current productive tasks equals δ times the shadowprice of organizational
capital, and both are equal to the wage.
Pf0 (h∗N∗)=δV ∗
L = w (5)
The shadowprice of organizational capital is multiplied by δ because allocating an extra
worker to organizational tasks increases the stock of organizational capital only by δ,
see (2). Because, by (5), V ∗
L is constant over time, the envelope condition for L also




L = w (6)
The marginal product of an extra worker in organizational tasks also equals the wage
(and the marginal product of that worker in current productive activities). The mar-
ginal product of one extra unit of organizational capital f0 (L) is multiplied by a factor
δ/(r + δ) because one extra worker increases L only by δ but this higher L then lasts for-
ever. The inﬁnite stream of higher production because of the increase in L is discounted
at rate r + δ because the organizational capital stock depreciates at rate δ.
In the frictionless optimum the marginal products of an extra worker in current
productive activities and in organizational tasks are equal to each other and equal to
the wage at all times, and employment N∗ as well as the fraction of workers allocated
to productive tasks h∗ are constant over time. Without adjustment costs, the solution
to the dynamic proﬁt maximization problem (3) is the statically optimal allocation.
The desired number of workers allocated to current productive tasks is increasing in
productivity P, but because the production function is additively separable, the optimal
level of organizational capital does not depend on P.
3 Fixed adjustment costs
Now suppose that there are ﬁxed adjustment costs φ associated with changing the
number of employed workers N. A te v e r yp o i n ti nt i m eﬁr m sh a v et od e c i d ew h e t h e r
or not to adjust employment. If they do, they pay the adjustment costs φ.W h e t h e ro r
not they adjust the number of employees, ﬁrms can always costlessly adjust labor along
the intensive margin and allocate more or less workers to current productive tasks. This
recursive formulation of proﬁt maximization problem (3) is summarized by the Bellman
equation.














{Pf(hN)+f (L) − Nw+ δ [(1 − h)N − L]VL}
À
(7)
where VL is the derivative of the value function with respect to L or the shadowprice of
organizational capital.
Suppose the economy initially is in steady state, when there is an increase in pro-
ductivity P. I will show that for a range of values for the adjustment costs, the optimal
8policy involves employment adjustment after a delay. The proof runs by contradiction.
Suppose that delayed adjustment is not optimal. Then, the optimal policy must be
either to immediately hire some more workers or to never do so. In sections 3.1 and
3.2, I solve for the net present value of proﬁts under each of these policies, which I
denote by VIA and VNA respectively. In section 3.3, I then show that for some values
of φ there is a feasible adjustment strategy involving delayed adjustment that gives a
higher net present value of proﬁts, denoted by VDA, than never adjusting employment,
VDA−φ>V NA at time t →∞ , whereas for the same values of φ never adjusting employ-
ment gives higher proﬁts than immediately adjusting employment, VNA >V IA − φ at
time t =0 . Therefore, neither of the two possible strategies without delay was optimal
and it must be that the optimal policy involves delay. Another way to say this is that
for some values for φ it is eventually optimal to adjust employment, but initially it is
not.
3.1 No employment adjustment
If ﬁrms decide not to adjust employment N, the Bellman equation (7) reduces to
rV (L;N,P)=m a x
h
{Pf(hN)+f (L) − Nw+ δ [(1 − h)N − L]VL} (8)
In this case the ﬁrst order condition for h, which prescribes that the marginal product
of one extra worker in doing current productive tasks equals δ times the shadowprice
of organizational capital, can be combined with the envelope condition (or co-state










In combination with the law of motion for L (2), the Euler equation forms a system
of two diﬀerential equations in h(t) and L(t). The system admits a unique steady
state and is saddle path stable.5 Therefore, there is a unique path for h and L that
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions, an initial condition for the state variable L and a
transversality condition. This solution takes the usual form that h immediately jumps
when P changes, after which h and L converge to their steady state values.
The steady state solution is given by ¯ L =
¡














When P increases, in the long run the number of worker in current productive activities
¯ hN has to increase and/or the number of workers in organizational tasks
¡
1 − ¯ h
¢
N has
to decrease to equalize the marginal product of a worker in each type of task. Because
the total number of employed workers N is ﬁxed, it must be that the fraction of workers
assigned to current production ¯ h is increased. Notice that if the production function is
5That the steady state exists and is unique can be seen from (10) with f (.) strictly concave. Local
saddle path stability is shown by linearizing the system around the steady state and calculating the
eigenvalues of the linearized system. Global saddle path stability follows because the ˙ L =0curve is
strictly decreasing and the ˙ h =0curve is strictly increasing because f (.) is strictly concave.














































































Figure 1: Phase diagram for the dynamics of L and h for ﬁxed N. Parameters: α =1 /3,
r =4 %per annum, δ = 24% per annum.
of the Cobb-Douglas form, then N drops out of condition (10) and the h that satisﬁes
this equation is the same that satisﬁes conditions (5) and (6), so that ¯ h = h∗.
An increase in P raises the marginal product of an extra worker in current produc-
tion, making it higher than the marginal product of an extra worker in organizational
tasks and higher than the wage. By reallocating some workers from organizational tasks
to productive activities, ﬁrms increase production and reduce the organizational capital
stock, thus reducing the productivity of the marginal worker in productive tasks and
increasing the productivity of organizational capital until these are equal again. Firms
would also like to equalize the marginal product of labor to the wage, but without hiring
more workers that is impossible. By reallocating workers within the ﬁrm, the gap be-
tween the marginal product of an extra worker in production and the wage is reduced,
though not to zero. The intensive margin is distorted (the marginal product of an extra
worker in organizational tasks now also exceeds the wage) and absorbs part of the dis-
tortion along the extensive margin. Firms cannot equate the marginal product of labor
to the wage because they have only one instrument (the allocation of workers within the
ﬁrm h) with which to minimize the overall distortion along two margins.
Now consider the transition dynamics in response to an increase in productivity P.
Because in steady state the fraction of workers assigned to current productive activities
increases, the steady state level of the organizational capital stock ¯ L goes down. Thus,
in response to the increase in P organizational capital declines. But since it can do
so only gradually, during the transition L is greater than its new steady state level,
so that the marginal product of organizational capital is smaller than in steady state.
By the Euler equation (9) that implies that ˙ h<0, the fraction of workers allocated to
10direct productive activities gradually decreases (notice that the left-hand side of (9) is
negative because f00 < 0). Therefore, h must have initially jumped up overshooting its
new higher steady state level. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The intuition is that it is
optimal to allocate a few more workers from organizational tasks to production, which
in the long run will lead to a lower stock of organizational capital. But in the short run
the stock of organizational capital is still at its old higher level. Firms take advantage
of that by taking even more workers away from organizational tasks, running down the
organizational capital stock faster in order to bring forward higher production. As the
excess stock of organizational capital gets depleted, some workers are reallocated back
from current production to organizational tasks.
The net present value of proﬁts conditional on never adjusting employment, is ob-




e−rt[Pf(hNAN)+f (LNA) − Nw]dt (11)
where hNA(t) and LNA(t) follow the dynamics described here and their steady state
levels ¯ hNA = h∗ and ¯ LNA satisfy (10) and ¯ LNA =( 1− h∗)N.
The value of the program VNA(L(t);N,P) decreases over time because the orga-
nizational capital stock L is gradually run down. Proﬁts are highest in the beginning
because hNA and LNA and therefore production are at their highest levels immediately
after the increase in productivity and then decrease.
3.2 Immediate employment adjustment
If employment is adjusted immediately after the increase in productivity, it is set to
maximize the value of the program henceforward. Because after the initial adjustment,
employment remains constant, the value of the program is given by (11) for given N.




Because the optimal amount of hiring will depend on the initial value of the organiza-
tional capital stock, in general it is hard to solve for VIA.
The problem simpliﬁes considerably if the economy was initially in the frictionless
optimum L = L∗. I nr e s p o n s et oa ni n c r e a s ei np r o d u c t i v i t yP, in the absence of
adjustment costs, by (5) it is optimal to increase labor input in current productive
activities hN. However, from (6) the optimal level of the stock of organizational capital
L and therefore by law of motion (2) also the optimal labor input in organizational tasks
(1 − h)N are not aﬀected by the increase in P. If there were no adjustment costs, ﬁrms
would hire extra workers and assign all of them to current productive activities, keeping
the number of workers performing organizational tasks constant. And if the economy
was in steady state before the increase in P,t h e nhN and L are immediately at their
optimal levels after the increase in productivity as well so that there are no dynamics
beyond the initial adjustments in h and N. A single burst of hiring immediately takes
the economy to its new steady state level. But that adjustment policy is also feasible if











Figure 2: Net present value of proﬁts over time if both employment and the allocation
of workers within the ﬁrm are adjusted VIA compared to the net present value of proﬁts
if only the intensive margin is adjusted VNA.
the value of the program in this case equals the value of the ﬁrm in the frictionless model
if the economy was initially in steady state. Unlike in the case where employment is
not adjusted, ﬁrms have two instruments to adjust labor input, h and N, and they can
equalize the marginal product of an extra worker both in current productive activities
f0 (hN) and in organizational tasks f0 (L) to the wage.
Because there are no dynamics beyond the initial adjustments in h and N,p r o ﬁts
are constant over time and the value of the program is just the annuity value of an




[Pf(h∗N∗)+f (L∗) − N∗w] (13)
where h∗, N∗ and L∗ satisfy conditions (5) and (6) with L∗ =( 1− h∗)N∗.
3.3 Delayed adjustment
Now consider the decision whether or not to hire extra workers. If a ﬁrm decides to
hire more workers, it will do so optimally and the net present value of its proﬁts in that
case is given by (13). If it decides not to adjust employment, it will still set h optimally
and its value is given by (11). Because N is set optimally, the value of the ﬁrm after
employment has been adjusted must by higher than if it is not, see (12). The question
is whether the diﬀerence in value is suﬃcient to merit paying the adjustment costs φ.
This is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. As argued in section 3.1, the value of the program in the
case when employment is not adjusted decreases over time.
12The picture shows three diﬀerent cases. If the adjustment costs are very low (relative
to the size of the change in productivity), net proﬁts when workers are hired are always
higher than proﬁts if employment is not adjusted. In this case, the increase in the value
of the ﬁrm from adjusting employment is always worth paying the adjustment costs, and
as soon as productivity increases ﬁrms will decide to hire more workers. The second case
is when adjustment costs are very high. In this case the increased value of the program
by hiring more workers is not worth paying the adjustment costs, and ﬁrms will never
adjust employment.
The middle case is the more interesting one. For intermediate values of the adjust-
ment costs, proﬁts are initially higher if a ﬁrm decides not to adjust employment, but
after a while that may reverse because proﬁts are decreasing. If a ﬁrm decides not to
adjust employment when productivity changes, it will regret that choice at a later point
in time. But this does not necessarily imply that it is optimal to postpone adjusting
employment. Suppose a ﬁrm decides to hire more workers as soon proﬁts become lower
than net proﬁts would have been if employment would have been adjusted immediately
after the increase in P. A tt h a tp o i n t ,p r o ﬁts do not stay at the same level, because
the organizational capital stock is at a lower level than it would have been if these
workers had been hired when the change in productivity occurred. Therefore, there are
costs as well as beneﬁts to postponing employment adjustment compared to adjusting
immediately after a change in productivity.
By postponing to hire more workers, initially the value of the program is higher
because no adjustment costs have to be paid. Of course production is lower than if em-
ployment would have been adjusted to its optimal level, but the net eﬀect of postponing
adjustment costs and postponing higher production is positive. The cost of delaying
adjustment is that after employment is adjusted, L is lower than it would have been if
more workers had been hired immediately. To determine if the beneﬁts outweigh the
costs, I need to be speciﬁc about the adjustment policy if employment is adjusted after
a delay. I will propose a feasible adjustment policy that involves delayed employment
adjustment and show that it gives higher proﬁts than both immediately adjusting and
never adjusting employment. Then, the optimal policy must involve at least some delay
in adjustment.
Proposition 1 In the organizational capital model with ﬁxed costs φ of adjusting em-
ployment, there is a range of values for φ>0 for which it is not optimal to adjust employ-
ment immediately after the change in productivity but it is optimal to do so eventually.
Therefore, the optimal adjustment policy involves delayed employment adjustment.
Proof. Consider the following adjustment policy. When productivity increases,
initially no new workers are hired and the fraction of workers assigned to current pro-
ductive tasks is set to the level h∗ that is optimal in steady state. Then, after a very
long time T →∞ , new workers are hired, setting employment to the same levels that
would have been optimal if these workers would have been hired immediately, maintain-
ing the fraction of workers assigned to current production at h∗. If before the increase in





[N∗,h ∗] for t ≥ T
(14)
13where h∗ and N∗ are given by (10) and (5). While not necessarily optimal, this policy is
clearly feasible. I will show that for intermediate values of the adjustment costs φ,t h i s
adjustment policy results in higher proﬁts both than adjusting immediately and than
never adjusting employment.
First, consider the program before employment is adjusted, t<T.W i t hh = h∗ and
N<N ∗ constant, the organizational capital stock, which initially is at its frictionless
optimum, is depleted exponentially by its law of motion (2).
˙ LDA = δ [(1 − h∗)N − LDA]=δ
£¯ LNA− LDA
¤




L∗ − ¯ LNA
¢
e−δt for 0 ≤ t<T
Because time T is inﬁnitely far away, the value of a ﬁrm under the delayed adjustment
policy VDA,t at time t =0equals the value of a ﬁrm that will never adjust employment.


















Comparing this value to the value of the ﬁrm if employment is adjusted immediately
after the change in productivity (13), adjusting immediately is not optimal if
VIA(L∗;P) − VDA,t=0 (L∗,N;P) ≡ φ <φ (16)
Now, consider the program at date T →∞ . By this time, the stock of organizational
capital has been depleted to its steady state level LDA(T)=¯ LNA.B e c a u s ef o rt ≥ T,
employment and the fraction of workers in current productive tasks are again constant
and N = N∗ is now set to its frictionless optimum level, organizational capital is being
built up again and exponentially moves towards L∗ =( 1− h∗)N∗.
LDA(t)=L∗ +
¡¯ LNA− L∗¢
e−δ(t−T) for t ≥ T



















If this value is greater than VNA
¡¯ LNA;N,P
¢









The set of values for the adjustment costs φ for which (16) and (18) are simultane-
ously satisﬁed is non-empty if φ < φ. Substituting (11), (13), (15) and (17) into (16)
14and (18), we get






























Because the production function is strictly concave, by Jensen’s inequality
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h∗N∗ − h∗N − N∗ + N + L∗ − ¯ LNA
¤
=0
which completes the proof that there is a non-empty set of positive values for φ for which
the optimal policy involves delayed adjustment.
The result that delayed adjustment is optimal for a range of values for the adjust-
ment depends on three important ingredients of the model: concavity of the production
function, the fact that organizational capital is gradually depleted if employment is not
adjusted and discounting. Concavity is important because if the production function
is linear, current productive tasks and organizational capital are perfect substitutes, in
which case there is no interior optimum allocation of workers within the ﬁrm. Therefore,
any positive organizational capital stock is used up immediately and L equals zero in
steady state, regardless of the value of P.W i t h L equal to zero, there is no intensive
margin of adjustment available that can be used to respond to changes in productivity
without adjusting employment.
The assumption that organizational capital is gradually depleted if employment is
not adjusted in response to an increase in productivity implies that ¯ LNA <L ∗ so that
eventually the incentive to adjust employment is higher than initially. The more persis-
tent is organizational capital, the wider is the range of values for the adjustment costs for
which it is optimal to delay employment adjustments. To see this, consider a small shock
to P so that ¯ LNA is close to L∗, and take second order Taylor approximations of the pro-
duction function around the frictionless optimum to get an approximate expression for
φ−φ. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with α ≡− L∗f00 (L∗)/f0 (L∗) > 0
and using (6) to substitute out for L∗, this expression can be written as
φ − φ ' −
δf00 (L∗)
(r +2 δ)(r + δ)







¶1/α ¡¯ LNA− L∗¢2 (20)
15The factor
¡¯ LNA− L∗¢2 measures the size of the change in P, which because of the
quadratic approximation results in a potential increase in production from adjusting
employment proportional to the square of the deviation of L from its optimal level. A
higher depreciation rate of organizational capital δ>0 decreases the range of values for
φ for which delayed adjustment is optimal, because it takes longer before the surplus
of the organizational capital stock is depreciated, as measured by the eﬀective discount
rate r+2δ for this surplus. The intuition is that with a lower δ, organizational tasks are
less similar to frequent tasks in production and the proﬁt maximization is less similar
to the standard static problem. In addition, a higher δ decreases the marginal product
of organizational capital (r + δ)w/δ. If it was initially not optimal to adjust employ-
ment, a lower marginal production of organizational capital makes it less likely that the
subsequent decrease in L makes employment adjustment eventually optimal.6
Finally, discounting is crucial because it provides an incentive to postpone the ad-
justment costs. Consider a ﬁrm that wants to hire more workers, but is considering
to delay this adjustment. The gain from postponing the adjustment costs is that the
adjustment costs can be paid later. The costs from postponing the adjustment consists
of two parts: production is lower than if employment is set to its optimal level, and over
time production decreases even further as the organizational capital stock is run down.
Since the second eﬀect is second order, it is irrelevant when considering postponing the
adjustment costs by a very short period of time. Postponing the ﬁrst order increase in
production generates costs equal to the diﬀerence in the ﬂow proﬁts times the period of
delay. These costs are independent of the discount rate. The gain from adjusting the
adjustment costs φ on the other hand, generates ﬂow beneﬁts rφ that are increasing in
the discount rate. Therefore, if the discount rate is higher, it is more likely that delayed
employment adjustment is preferred over immediate adjustment. Because a similar ar-
gument holds after L gets depleted, it is less obvious that a higher discount rate increases
the range of values for the adjustment costs that give rise to delayed adjustment. But
for a Cobb-Douglas production function this is the case, see (20).
3.4 Generalizations
Clearly, the baseline model in sections 2 and 3 is very stylized. In this section I brieﬂy
discuss if and how the most important simplifying assumptions aﬀect the result that it
is optimal to delay employment adjustment.
3.4.1 Production technology
Production function (1) is restrictive for two reasons: it is additively separable and
assumes the same degree of curvature (diminishing returns) in current productive tasks
and organizational capital. It is straightforward to show that the latter simplifying
assumption is not important. Allowing for a production function of the form Y =
Pf(hN)+g(L), the analysis in section 3 goes through unchanged if both f (.) and g (.)
6Notice that φ − φ > 0 is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for delayed adjustment and it is
therefore not true that for all values of the adjustment costs above φ it is optimal not to adjust and
for all values below φ it is optimal to adjust immediately. But as φ − φ becomes arbitrarily large for
arbitrarily small δ, the range of values for the adjustment costs for which delayed adjustment is optimal
must become arbitrarily large as well.
16are strictly concave. Additive separability however, is important to the result. In the







β ∈ [0,1] is the share of organizational capital in total labor input and θ measures the
degree to which regular productive tasks and organizational capital are substitutes. The
elasticity of substitution between current productive tasks and organizational capital is
1/(1 − θ) ∈ (0,∞),w h e r eθ →− ∞corresponds to an elasticity of substitution of 0
(perfect complements), θ =1corresponds to inﬁnite elasticity of substitution (perfect
substitutes) and θ → 0 corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas production function with an
elasticity of substitution equal to one.
With this more general production technology, the model displays delayed adjust-
ment if θ>0. This restriction is necessary to guarantee that when productivity in-
creases, more workers are assigned to current productive activities. The intuition is that
changes in P have two counteracting eﬀects on the optimal fraction of workers h that are
assigned to current production. First, an increase in P makes current productive tasks
relatively more productive, increasing the optimal fraction of workers assigned to these
tasks. But second, an increase in P directly increases the input of productive activities
PhN into the production function. When each worker becomes more productive in
performing these tasks, less workers are necessary to perform the same number of tasks.
If there are strong complementarities between productive tasks and organizational cap-
ital, which is the case for θ<0, the second eﬀect dominates. The intuitive case is that
regular productive tasks and organizational capital are suﬃciently substitutable so that
an increase in productivity shifts the allocation of workers from organizational tasks
to production. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function (with θ =0or an
elasticity of substitution of 1)t h et w oe ﬀects exactly cancel out. Another way to see
this is that with a Cobb-Douglas production function, a ‘current production enhancing’
technological change in P is indistinguishable from a change in total factor productivity
A. And because a change in total factor productivity aﬀects the productivity of produc-
tive tasks and organizational capital equally, it does not change the optimal allocation
of workers between the two types of tasks.
3.4.2 Stochastic productivity
The baseline model is deterministic in order to make the analysis more tractable. I
analyzed changes in productivity as a comparative statics exercise, and these changes
must be interpreted as unanticipated and permanent. Clearly therefore, the results in
section 3 do not depend on the stochastic nature of productivity shocks. But from what
we know about stochastic models with non-convex adjustment costs, stochastic produc-
tivity shocks may strengthen the results for two reasons. First, in a stochastic model
the ‘option value of waiting’ provides another reason to discount the future apart from
impatience. The probability that the productivity shock is reversed plays a role similar
to the discount rate and makes delayed adjustment more likely to be optimal. Secondly,
if shocks to productivity are transitory rather than permanent, they have a stronger
eﬀect on the relative productivity of productive versus organizational tasks. Because
17productive activities are frequent tasks, their productivity is immediately related to P.
Organizational capital however, lasts for a period of time. If during this period the
increase in productivity is reversed, then organizational tasks performed today become
less productive. That diminishes the incentive to invest in organizational capital at
times when productivity is high. Stronger mean reversion in the productivity shocks
plays a similar role to a higher θ in (21), making it more likely that delayed adjustment
is optimal.
3.4.3 General equilibrium
The model in this section is a partial equilibrium model: for a given wage w all ﬂuc-
tuations in employment are driven by changes in labor demand. Alternatively, proﬁt
maximization problem (3) can be interpreted as the intertemporal utility maximization
problem of a representative household that owns the ﬁrm and decides how many of its
members to send to work in it while distributing all its output among its members for
immediate consumption. That problem is equivalent if (i) employed workers cannot
choose how many hours they want to work, (ii) the utility function is linear in con-
sumption and (iii) the consumption good is non-storable. If workers cannot choose how
many hours to work, then market clearing on the labor market requires that all workers
are indiﬀerent between working full-time or being unemployed so that the wage equals
the reservation wage at all times. Linear utility and a non-storable consumption good
imply that the household has neither an incentive nor an opportunity for consumption
smoothing. While the ﬁrst assumption is arguably realistic, the assumption that there is
no saving clearly is not. However, the results for employment adjustment in this section
go through in a more general model with a nondegenerate consumption choice.7
4 Convex adjustment costs
This section analyzes the simple organizational capital model when adjustment costs in
employment are convex. With convex adjustment costs, employment adjustments are
continuous and can be represented by a law of motion for employment,
˙ N = n (22)
where n is the amount of employment adjustment (hiring or ﬁring) which is a control
variable to the ﬁrm. The adjustment costs are φ(n)=1
2φn2 and the Bellman equation
for proﬁt maximization problem (3) subject to (2) and (22) is given by,
rV (L,N;P)=m a x
h,n
©
Pf(hN)+f (L) − Nw− 1
2φn2
+δ [(1 − h)N − L]VL + nVN} (23)
where VN is the partial derivative of the value function with respect to N or the shad-
owprice of an extra employed worker.
Because employment adjustments are locally costless and reversible, there is no rea-
son to postpone adjustments. Nevertheless the gist of the result in the previous section
7A note, in which I analyze the organizational capital model with ﬁxed adjustment costs in general
equilibrium, is available from my website at www.princeton.edu/~tvanrens.
18carries over to this case. I will show that in the model with convex adjustment costs it
is optimal to ‘delay’ employment adjustments, in the sense that the largest adjustment
takes place a while after a change in productivity. See the discussion of the simulated
impulse responses in section 6.1 for a more detailed interpretation of this result.
4.1 First order conditions
Combining the ﬁrst order and envelope conditions gives Euler equations for h and n,
which describe adjustments along the intensive and extensive margin. The Euler equa-
tion for h is similar to its Euler equation if employment is not adjusted (9) but includes
















Employment adjustments n satisfy a second Euler equation.
˙ n = rn−
Pf0 (hN) − w
φ
(25)
The Euler equations for h and n, combined with the laws of motion (2) and (22) for
L and N, form a system of four ﬁrst-order ordinary diﬀerential equations in the four
v a r i a b l e sa sf u n c t i o n so ft i m e .
In the long run the model with convex adjustment costs reaches the frictionless
o p t i m u m ,a sc a nb es e e nb ys u b s t i t u t i n g ˙ N = n =0and ˙ n =0into (25) and n =0and
˙ h =0into (24) and comparing to (5) and (6). But in the short run, if the adjustment
costs φ are suﬃciently high, hiring n is close to zero and the model behaves essentially as
if employment is ﬁxed. Thus, in response to an increase in productivity, ﬁrms ﬁrst use
the intensive margin of adjustment. As the stock of organizational capital is gradually
depleted, h decreases again and by (25) hiring increases because the marginal product of
an extra worker in current productive tasks exceeds the wage by more. An alternative
way to understand this, is that ﬁrms set the speed at which they hire new workers in
order to (approximately) equate the marginal adjustment costs to the marginal costs of
not adjusting employment.8 When the organizational capital stock is depleted, workers
are assigned back to doing organizational tasks which increases the marginal costs of not
hiring more workers. Therefore, it becomes optimal to hire at a faster rate even though
this increases the marginal adjustment costs. Eventually, as employment approaches its
new optimum after a period of hiring, the hiring rate falls back to zero as the marginal
product of an extra worker approaches w again.
8If φ is suﬃciently high then N is approximately constant and n ' 0, so that the allocation of
workers within the ﬁrm h moves according to (9). Then, the Euler equation for hiring (25) is decoupled
from the rest of the system and its only solution that satisﬁes transversality is ˙ n =0so that rn =
(Pf
0 (hN) − w)/φ or φn =( Pf
0 (hN) − w)/r. The left-hand side of this expression are the marginal
adjustment costs, the right-hand side is the annuity value of the marginal costs from not adjusting
employment.
194.2 Persistence in hiring
In a model with convex adjustment costs in employment but no organizational capital,
we expect hiring to jump up to its highest level immediately after the increase in produc-
tivity. But in the organizational capital model with convex adjustment costs, hiring may
continue to increase after its initial jump. Therefore employment adjustment is delayed
in the sense that the largest amount of hiring occurs not immediately after the increase
but a while later. I derive a parameter condition under which ˙ n>0 immediately after
an increase in productivity.
Euler equation (25) can be used to calculate ˙ n given the initial values for h and n
immediately after the shock. The transversality condition prescribes that in the proﬁt
maximizing allocation h and n have to be on the stable manifold for every L and N.
This provides two boundary conditions which in combination with initial conditions for
L and N determine a unique solution to the system of diﬀerential equations. There is no
closed-form solution for the stable manifold (the policy rules) in the nonlinear model.9
Therefore I linearize the system around its steady state. For small shocks to productivity,
the stable hyperplane of the linearized system is a good approximation of the nonlinear
stable manifold because with a convex adjustment cost function, (3) is a well-deﬁned
concave dynamic programming problem with an interior solution. Numerical simulations
of the nonlinear model indicate that for changes in productivity of up to 10% the impulse
responses of the linear and the nonlinear model are very similar.
For simplicity, I assume that after the increase in productivity P = δ/(r + δ) so
that in steady state ¯ h = h∗ =1 /2, which allows to focus on the more interesting model
parameters. Then, the linearized system is given by,
























where ˆ L =( L − L∗)/L∗, ˆ h =( h − h∗)/h∗ and ˆ N =( N − N∗)/N ∗ are written in terms
of relative deviations from steady state, ˆ n = n/N∗ and α = − f00 ( )/f0 ( ), evaluated
in steady state   = h∗N∗ = L∗ = N∗/2. It is straightforward to show that the linear
system is saddle-path stable. The stable hyperplane is described by the two stable
eigenvectors of the matrix A. In appendix A, I derive closed-form expressions for the
coeﬃcients in the linear policy rules ˆ h = ηLˆ L + ηN ˆ N and ˆ n = νLˆ L + νN ˆ N in terms of
the model parameters.
Substituting the policy rules into the linearized version of Euler equation (25) gives
an expression for ˙ n. Assuming the economy was initially in steady state, immediately
9Combining the ﬁrst order conditions for h and n and the envelope conditions for L and N gives
as y s t e mo ft w op a r t i a ld i ﬀerential equations in the policy rules for h and n as functions of the state
variables L and N. Even in the much simpler model of section 3.1, where there is just one policy rule,
there is no closed-form solution for h(L;N). In that case the policy rule is described by the ordinary
diﬀerential equation,










where hL = h
0 (L), which has a closed-form solution only for a quadratic production function.





φN∗ (1 + ηN)+rνN
¶
ˆ N (27)
The terms multiplying ˆ L drop out of this expression because if the system was initially
in steady state, then L is still in steady state after the increase in productivity because
the steady state level for the organizational capital stock does not depend on P,s ot h a t
ˆ L =0 . If productivity increases then the steady state employment level N∗ increases
by (5), so that ˆ N<0 immediately after the shock. Then, for ˙ n>0 it must be that the
term multiplying ˆ N is negative. Substituting the expressions for ηN and νN from the
appendix and simplifying, we get the following condition for persistence in hiring.
Proposition 2 In the organizational capital model with convex costs of adjusting em-
ployment, hiring reaches its highest level not immediately but some time after an increase
in productivity if the adjustment costs φ are suﬃciently high and the depreciation rate
for organizational capital δ is suﬃciently low. If the steady state level for the fraction
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(28)
For the derivation of condition (28) see appendix A. The condition that h∗ =1 /2 is
for convenience only and for values of P that give rise to a fraction of workers slightly
smaller or greater than 1/2 in steady state, condition (28) still holds approximately. As
stated in the proposition, the main implication of the condition is that the depreciation
rate for organizational capital needs to be suﬃciently low and the adjustment costs
suﬃciently high for the model to generate a hump-shaped impulse response for hiring.
Like in proposition 1, a higher depreciation rate makes organizational capital more
similar to regular frequent tasks so that the model behaves more like a standard model.
Also consistent with the conclusions for the model with non-convex adjustment costs,
a higher discount rate makes the role of the intensive margin more pronounced. In the
m o d e lw i t hc o n v e xc o s t s ,t h a tr e s u l ti sd r i v e nm a i n l yb yt h ern term in the linearized
Euler equation for hiring. A higher interest rate makes ﬁr m sl e s sw i l l i n gt oi n c u rt h e
cost of fast adjustments today in order to reach the optimal level of employment faster
in the future.
Unlike in proposition 1, condition (28) does not specify a range of values for the
adjustment costs but just poses a lower bound on φ. That is because with convex
adjustment costs adjusting is always costless in the (very) long run, regardless of the
size of the adjustment costs. If the costs are not high enough however, it is not worth
distorting the intensive margin in order to incur less adjustment costs by adjusting
slower. There is a trade-oﬀ between the value of δ and the lower bound on φ.T h em o r e
sluggish organizational capital is, the lower the adjustment costs can be while the model
still generates persistence in hiring. The curvature of the production function α and
the wage w are not very important here; they determine the degree to which distortion
of the intensive margin results in a pressure for employment adjustment through the
Pf0 (hN) − w term in the Euler equation for n.
215 Organizational capital in an RBC model
In order to evaluate the quantitative importance of organizational capital for business
cycle ﬂuctuations in employment, I evaluate how the predictions from a model with
organizational capital compare to those of existing models. In this section, I ﬁrst present
a few stylized facts on business cycle ﬂuctuations in employment. Then, I add some
realism to the model in the previous section by relaxing its most restrictive simplifying
assumptions, simulate it and compare the model predictions to these facts.
The model in sections 2, 3 and 4 is deliberately simple in order to focus on the main
model elements that drive the results. But it is too simple to allow for a comparison to
the data. The extended organizational capital model with convex adjustment costs is
a general equilibrium model with a more general form for the production function and
a stochastic process for productivity shocks. With convex adjustment costs linearizing
provides a good approximation of the dynamics of the nonlinear model and the lin-
earization allows to analyze the model in this more general setup. The natural point of
reference is a standard real business cycle (RBC) model, of which the extended model
is an extension with with convex adjustment costs in employment and organizational
capital.
5.1 Business cycle facts
The movement of employment over the business cycle is often summarized by its stan-
dard deviation relative to that of output and a set of cross-autocorrelations of log em-
ployment with log output at time t+s. Three stylized facts emerge from that analysis:
employment is (i) about as volatile as output, (ii) strongly procyclical, but (iii) lags
output by one to two quarters. In a compilation of business cycle statistics from ag-
gregate postwar US time series data, Stock and Watson (1999) ﬁnd that in eight broad
sectors of the US economy, the volatility of employment ranges from about 50% to 220%
of the standard deviation in log output. Employment is procyclical in all sectors. In
the more cyclical sectors (construction, manufacturing, service, wholesale and retail and
transportation), employment lags output by 1 to 2 quarters, in the sense that the cor-
relation of log employment is highest with log output lagged by 1 to 2 quarters. In the
less cyclical sectors (ﬁnance and real estate, mining and government) that lag is even
longer: 2 to 5 quarters. Aggregate employment has a relative standard deviation of 0.84,
a contemporaneous correlation with output of 0.81 and a maximum correlation of 0.92
after one quarter. These stylized facts are similar for business cycles in other countries
(Backus, Kehoe and Kydland 1995, Millard, Scott and Sensier 1997).
5.2 The extended model
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of workers. Each worker owns a ﬁrm
and all ﬁrms produce a homogeneous consumption good. The representative worker
decides how many hours N to work in her ﬁrm as well as how much of its output to
consume. She solves an intertemporal utility optimization problem, with utility u(c)+
(1 − N)γ additively separable and linear in leisure. The utility gain from not working
γ can be interpreted as utility from leisure, home production, unemployment beneﬁto r
22commuting costs. I maintain the assumption that utility over leisure is linear because I
interpret N as employment in persons.10
Output that is not consumed can be invested to build up the stock of physical capital
K. This provides a mechanism for workers to smooth their consumption. Because all
workers and all ﬁrms are identical, the intertemporal budget constraint of the represen-
tative worker equals the aggregate resource constraint.
˙ K = Y − c − δKK (29)
where c is consumption of the representative agent as well as aggregate consumption,
K is the aggregate capital stock and δK is the depreciation rate of (physical) capital.
The return on capital is endogenous because capital enters in the production function,







Productivity P is stochastic and follows and Itô process with stochastic diﬀerential
equation,
dP = −µP logPdt+ σPdz (31)
where z is a standard Brownian motion, dz ∼ N (0,dt), µ is a drift parameter and
σ is the standard deviation of innovations in logP. This is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process (the equivalent of a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process in discrete time) in logP,
which guarantees that P is always positive. Because the drift is positive if P<1 and
negative if P>1, the process is mean-reverting towards ¯ P =1 . Productivity, capital
and consumption have been divided by a common trend component to remove long
run growth from the model and the mean of the resulting productivity variable P is
normalized to one. The parameter µ measures the degree of mean-reversion with µ =0
for permanent shocks and µ>0 for transitory shocks to productivity.
With these extensions, the capital stock K and productivity P are added to the state
vector and consumption c becomes a choice variable. The representative agent solves
the following stochastic dynamic optimization problem,






u(c)+( 1− N)γ − 1
2φn2¤
dt (32)
where ρ is the discount rate, subject to the law of motion for organizational capital (2),
the aggregate resource constraint (29) with production Y as in (30), the law of motion
for employment (22) and the stochastic process for productivity (31). For convenience
Id e ﬁne the adjustment costs as direct reductions in utility. Notice that proﬁtm a x i -
mization problem (3) is a special case of (32) if K is ﬁxed, utility over consumption
u(.) is linear, the discount rate equals the interest rate ρ = r and the wage equals the
reservation wage w = γ.
10To make it more natural to think of N as employment in persons, the problem can be interpreted
as the intertemporal optimization problem of a representative household that owns a ﬁrm and decides
how many of its members to send to work. Because of exogenous constraints, workers can only work in
the ﬁrm full time, as in Hansen (1985).
23The ﬁrst order and envelope conditions of problem (32) can be combined to give
Euler equations for consumption c, the fraction of worker in current productive tasks
h and hiring n, and an envelope condition for the shadowprice of productivity VP.
These form a system of four partial diﬀerential equations in the policy rules or, together
with the four constraints, a system of eight stochastic ordinary diﬀerential equations
in the model variables as functions of time. In appendix B, I derive these equations,
linearize the system and outline the solution method for the linearized policy rules. In
the linearized model there is certainty equivalence: the policy rules and therefore the
impulse functions do not depend on the degree of uncertainty σ.
5.3 Calibration
For comparability, I follow the parameterization of a standard RBC model as in King and
Rebelo (1999). Utility over consumption is logaritmic, corresponding to an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion both equal to one. This
is the only additively separable utility function that has the balanced growth property:
permanent changes in productivity do not lead to permanent changes in employment.
The capital share α in the production function is one third, and the depreciation rate
of capital is set to 10% per year.
For the discount rate ρ, King and Rebelo use a value of 6.5% per year, the average
return on the S&P500 index from 1948 to 1986. A concern in setting this parameter,
is that it strongly aﬀects the consumption-output ratio in steady state. In King and
Rebelo’s calibration, this ratio is roughly equal to the observed value of 0.7. But in the
standard RBC model, N is interpreted as hours worked by the representative agent,
whereas in (32) I interpret N as employment in persons so that utility is linear in leisure
(King and Rebelo use a logaritmic speciﬁcation). With linear utility over leisure, a
discount rate of 6.5% implies a consumption-output ratio that is much too high, so I
use a 4% discount rate instead, which implies that consumption is about 75% of output
in steady state. This value for the discount rate is closer to the risk-free rate and has
been used among others by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen (1985). Because
a higher discount rate makes it more likely that the model displays delayed hiring, see
(28), using a lower discount rate also makes sure that the results are not driven by an
implausibly high value for this parameter.
Following Prescott (1986), King and Rebelo use an AR(1) process for log total fac-
tor productivity, which they estimate from empirical Solow residuals. The ﬁrst order
autocorrelation parameter equals 0.979 and the variance of its innovations is 0.0072 per
quarter. With β =0 , log total factor productivity in (30) equals logA +( 1− α)logP,
where A is a constant. Discretizing (31) in quarterly intervals, logP follows an AR(1)
process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient 1−µ and normally distributed innovations with
variance σ2,s ot h a t1 − µ is also the autocorrelation parameter for log total factor
productivity and (1 − α)σ is its standard deviation. Therefore, I set µ =0 .007 and
σ =0 .0042/(1 − α) per month.
The remaining parameters are speciﬁc to the organizational capital model. In the
baseline simulations, I use θ =1− α so that total labor input is additively separa-
ble in current productive activities and organizational capital, and vary the remaining
parameters φ, β and δ.
245.4 Simulations
A calibrated real business cycle model describes the aggregate time series data reasonable
well, in the sense that the standard deviations and correlations predicted by the model
are close to the ones observed in the data (Prescott 1986). The ﬁrst row of panel A
in table 1 presents standard deviations, autocorrelations and correlations with output
of some key variables in the data. The second row presents the same moments for the
standard RBC model (where N is interpreted as hours worked). These moments were
calculated by using the calibrated model to generate 2,500 years (10,000 quarters) of
simulated ‘data’ and detrending these time series using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with
a smoothing parameter of 1600. The results are almost identical to those reported by
King and Rebelo (1999).11
Comparing the simulations to the data in the ﬁrst row, reveals a number of well
documented facts about the performance of RBC models. The volatility of output
predicted by the model is about 80% of the volatility observed in the data and the model
correctly predicts that investment is about 3 times more volatile than output. But the
model has weak internal ampliﬁcation and propagation mechanisms (Cogley and Nason
1995, Rotemberg and Woodford 1996). Labor input is crucial to the RBC model, yet the
relative volatility of employment in the standard model is substantially lower than in the
data and the model counterfactually predicts almost perfect correlation of employment
with output (Kydland 1995, King and Rebelo 1999). Because employment is not volatile
enough, also labor productivity is far more procyclical than in the data.
Modelling labor supply along the extensive margin, in terms of the number of em-
ployed workers, rather than in terms of hours per worker (Rogerson 1988, Hansen 1985)
or modelling both a participation and an hours decision (Cho and Cooley 1994), im-
proves the model in terms of the relative volatility of employment and output. This
is illustrated in the third row, which presents simulated moments for the recalibrated
model, in which N is interpreted as employment in persons. These statistics are very
similar to those reported by Hansen. Employment becomes more volatile and labor
productivity less procyclical, but employment is still almost perfectly correlated with
output and the persistence predicted by the model does not change and remains too
low.
One natural way to build in more persistence is to introduce adjustment costs. Cog-
ley and Nason (1995) evaluate the performance of a number of diﬀerent models and ﬁnd
that adjustment costs (or lags in employment adjustment as in Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo 1993) improve the model’s ability to reproduce the observed autocorrelation
pattern for output. The next three rows explore this eﬀect. As the adjustment costs
increase, the model predicts a higher autocorrelation in employment and output but the
volatility of employment decreases, taking the model further from the data along that
dimension.12 For φ =1 0the model with adjustment costs in employment matches the
autocorrelation in employment observed in the data, at the cost of a 35% drop in the
11The small diﬀerences are because of a small correction to the aggregate resource constraint for long
run growth, which I ignore. The correct discrete time version of (29) is (1 − g)Kt+1 =( 1− δK)Kt+Y −c,
where g is the common growth rate along the balanced growth path. King and Rebelo set g =0 .4% per
quarter, consistent with the average growth of per capital output in the postwar US data.
12For low φ the relative volatility of employment slightly increases because the standard deviation of
output decreases by more than that of employment.
25relative volatility of employment.
Adjustment costs in employment also break the perfect comovement of employment
with output. Panel B provides some insight into why this happens. I report correla-
tions of employment with 6 lags and leads of output for the diﬀerent models, which
may again be compared to the correlations calculated from the data in the ﬁrst row.13
In the standard RBC model, the correlation of employment is highest with contempo-
raneous output. With adjustment costs in employment, the peak correlation between
employment and output declines very little, but employment starts to lag output, which
reduces the contemporaneous correlation.
Now consider the last eight rows of panels A and B, which present simulated mo-
ments for the model with organizational capital. I vary the adjustment costs φ and the
depreciation rate of organizational capital δ and set the share of organizational capital
in the production function to match the persistence in employment in the data. The
ﬁrst column reports the fraction of workers that perform organizational tasks in steady
state. As expected, higher adjustment costs or a slower depreciating organizational
capital stock imply that for a smaller share of organizational capital in production, the
model generates enough persistence in employment. For low depreciation rates, the
fraction of workers allocated to organizational tasks is very small.
Because the model with organizational capital requires lower adjustment costs than
the model with adjustment costs only to generate enough persistence in employment,
the volatility of employment and therefore the volatility of output decreases less in
these models (compared to the adjustment costs model with φ =1 0 , which matches
the persistence in employment). The model with organizational capital does as well
as the model with adjustment costs in generating the lag in employment with respect
to output, but matches the data slightly better in the sense that it generates enough
persistence in employment for more reasonable values of the adjustment costs.14
6 Impulse response functions
From the simulations in the previous section, it seems that the eﬀect of organizational
capital is similar to that of adjustment costs in employment. But unconditional mo-
ments can only give a partial picture of the model behavior. In fact, the underlying
dynamics are very diﬀerent for the organizational capital model and the model with
convex adjustment costs only. In order to better understand what drives the persistence
13The cross-autocorrelations for the actual data are taken from Stock and Watson (1999). Stock and
Watson focus on the ‘cyclical component’ of employment and output, using a bandpass ﬁlter that isolates
cyclical ﬂuctuations with periodicities between 6 quarters and 8 years. However, their results are similar
to those using the HP ﬁlter, which removes only low frequency ﬂuctuations.
14An alternative criterion for a reasonable value for φ is the fraction of the consumption good that is
lost because of adjustment costs. It turns out however, that in this sense the adjustment costs are always
negligible. With a logaritmic utility function over consumption, the amount of adjustment costs paid
1
2φn
2 can be immediately interpreted as a fraction of consumption,
1
2φn
2 = u(c) − u(c − ∆c) ' ∆c/c,
where ∆c is the amount of consumption that would have to be sacriﬁced to make the representative
agent equally well oﬀ if she did not have to pay the adjustment costs. For all values of φ in the table,
1
2φn
2 is smaller than 10
−7. The reason is that as the adjustment costs increase, the amount of hiring
n decreases. A reasonable value for φ therefore, is a value that gives rise to a realistic amount of hiring
and employment volatility.
26in employment generated by the model, I present impulse response functions and com-
pare these to the standard RBC model and the model with adjustment costs. Impulse
responses also allow to better evaluate the role of the diﬀerent parameters associated
with organizational capital.
6.1 Contribution of organizational capital
Figure 3 presents impulse response functions for the standard RBC model (solid lines)
as well as for the standard model with adjustment costs in employment (dashed lines)
to a permanent positive productivity shock (µ =0 ).15 In the standard RBC model,
all persistence in employment is driven by transition dynamics in the capital stock.
In response to the increase in productivity, output immediately increases almost to its
steady state level, but consumption increases by less than its eventual increase.16 The
diﬀerence is invested, so that the capital stock gradually converges to a higher level
that sustains the permanently higher production and consumption levels. Employment
initially increases because the increase in productivity raises the marginal product of
labor. In the long run, when capital has reached its new higher level, employment
goes back to the level before the increase in productivity. This is because balanced
growth preferences guarantee that in the long run the substitution and income eﬀect of
productivity on employment cancel out.
The fact that in the standard model the response of employment is largest immedi-
ately after the change gives rise to the almost perfect comovement of employment with
output, which also experiences the largest change right after the increase in produc-
tivity. Employment is not lagged with respect to output, and there is no endogenous
persistence in employment over and above the persistence in the transition of the capital
stock. With adjustment costs, employment becomes a state variable and can no longer
jump to its highest level immediately. Therefore, employment responds with a lag com-
pared to output. There is some additional persistence in employment which is driven
by the adjustment costs. The success of this model stops however, when we look at
the response of employment adjustments. Hiring jumps to its highest level immediately
after the productivity shock. This is a standard result in models with convex adjustment
costs but inconsistent with evidence on persistence in the hiring rate.
Figure 4 zooms in on the beginning of the boom and introduces organizational cap-
ital. Because ﬁrms now have a second margin of adjustment available to respond to the
increase in productivity, there is no immediate need for hiring. Initially, the fraction of
workers allocated to productive tasks jumps up substantially (by almost 1% in response
to a 1% increase in productivity). At that point there is little hiring, because the inten-
sive margin absorbs most of the shock. Then, as the organizational capital stock starts
to decrease, some of these workers are allocated back to organizational tasks. As this
happens, the need to have more employed workers becomes more urgent and hiring in-
creases. But during the same time also employment and the physical capital stock have
15Because the stochastic process for productivity shocks used for the simulations is highly persistent,
the impulse responses for these shocks are similar to those for permanent shocks. The main diﬀerence
is that as the productivity shock dies out, so do the responses of all model variables. Following the
literature, I present impulse responses to permanent shocks, which are easier to interpret.
16With a diﬀerent calibration consumption may initially even decrease
27increased. As employment approaches its peak level, hiring decreases again (eventually
becoming negative to bring employment back to its pre-shock level in the long run).
Persistence in employment in the organizational capital model is driven by persis-
tence in employment growth. The standard real business cycle model has little to say
about the hiring rate because a theory of job search is absent from this model.17 In the
presence of search frictions, a worker that loses or quits her job does not immediately ﬁnd
a new employer and therefore remains unemployed for a period while she searches. This
introduces an additional source of persistence in employment ﬂuctuations. Yet standard
search models (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994) do not predict enough persistence in
employment (Cole and Rogerson 1999) and do not not generate enough volatility in
hiring (Shimer 2004) to match business cycle ﬂuctuations. Evidence from worker ﬂow
data indicates that only a a very small fraction of persistence in unemployment is caused
by transition dynamics of the employment rate to its steady state level, the remainder
by persistent ﬂuctuations in employment growth and in particular in the hiring rate
(Shimer 2002, Hall 2004, 2005). Therefore, to understand why employment remains
low after the end of a recession, we must understand why the hiring rate remains low.
Organizational capital oﬀers a possible explanation. Even a small amount of persistence
in the hiring rate makes employment ﬂuctuations very persistent, see table 1.
6.2 Role of the parameters
6.2.1 Organizational capital share in the production function
The share of organizational capital in the production function is crucial for the shape of
the impulse responses in ﬁgure 4. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 5 where impulse responses
are plotted for three diﬀerent values of the steady state fraction of workers in organiza-
tional tasks. If organizational capital is a relatively unimportant part of total labor input
in production, the hump-shaped impulse response in hiring becomes less pronounced and
for very low β the responses for hiring and employment look like those in ﬁgure 3 for the
model with adjustment costs but without organizational capital. On the other hand, if
organizational capital is very important in production, the intensive margin eﬀect may
become so important that n initially jumps down. Even though employment has to in-
crease in the medium-long run in response to an increase in productivity, initially some
workers are ﬁred.18 W h yi st h i so p t i m a l ?
When productivity increases the optimal allocation is distorted. During the transi-
tion dynamics, ﬁrms can take advantage of the intensive margin of adjustment because
of the labor that is ‘stored’ in the form of organizational capital. When they start using
this stored labor, the marginal product of labor in the ﬁrm temporarily decreases. If
organizational capital is very important, the net eﬀect on the marginal product of labor
may be negative. In that case it is optimal to temporarily ﬁre some workers because
17Hall (1999) argues that this is the reason for the failure of standard RBC models to describe the
properties of employment ﬂuctuations observed in the data.
18One might interpret this result as indicating that the organizational capital model is consistent with
a number of recent VAR papers, which ﬁnd that the initial response of employment (or total hours) to
an increase in productivity is negative (Galí 1999, Francis and Ramey 2002, Basu, Fernald and Kimball
2004, Galí and Rabanal 2004). There is considerably disagreement in the literature about the response
of employment to a productivity shock, with other papers ﬁnding that the initial response is positive
(Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson 2003), in all cases with large error bands.
28their marginal product is lower than the value of leisure. When the intensive margin
gets depleted the marginal product of labor increases and these workers are hired again.
6.2.2 Substitution between tasks
Another parameter that is important for the behavior of the model is θ, which determines
t h ed e g r e et ow h i c hﬁrms can substitute between the two diﬀerent types of tasks. For an
increase in productivity to have a positive eﬀect on the fraction of workers h allocated to
current production, θ needs to be suﬃciently greater than zero. There are two potential
reasons for this parameter restriction. First, a higher θ makes it easier for ﬁrms to
substitute current productive tasks for organizational capital and vice versa. Second, a
higher θ makes P have a larger eﬀect on the relative productivity of current productive
tasks over organizational capital. To see which of these two eﬀects is important, I
simulated the model replacing L by PLin production function (30). In this speciﬁcation,
θ still aﬀects the elasticity of substitution between organizational and productive tasks,
but the eﬀect of P on the productivity of both types of tasks is always symmetric. In
this case the parameter θ has virtually no eﬀect on the simulated impulse responses.
Therefore, I conclude that it is the eﬀect of changes in P on the relative productivity of
the two types of tasks which is important for the results.
If organizational capital is to be relevant for business cycle ﬂuctuations, we need to
think of a boom as a period of high relative productivity of current productive tasks.
Organizational tasks are no more productive than in a recession. Then, because labor
overall is more valuable, ﬁrms will substitute organizational tasks for productive tasks
in a boom and vice versa in a recession. Even though the optimal level of organizational
capital is the same in a boom and in a recession, the actual level diﬀers because of this
substitution between tasks.19
6.2.3 Transitory productivity shocks
Transitory shocks to productivity have a larger eﬀect on the productivity of current pro-
ductive tasks than on organizational tasks even if both types of tasks are not very good
substitutes. A transitory increase in P aﬀects the productivity of current productive
tasks, but not the productivity of productive tasks in the future. But organizational
tasks aﬀect production both now and in the future, so that the productivity of organi-
zational tasks today depends on the productivity of organizational capital both today
and in the future. Therefore, a transitory productivity shock increases the relative
productivity of current productive activities over organizational tasks.
Quantitatively, this eﬀect turns is not very important. This is illustrated in ﬁgure
6, which presents impulse responses for the model with a Cobb-Douglas production
function (θ =0 , so that permanent productivity shocks have a symmetric eﬀect on the
productivity of the two types of tasks) for diﬀerent values of the persistence parameter
µ. More transitory shocks indeed have a slightly larger initial eﬀect on the allocation
between current productive and organizational tasks h,b u tt h ee ﬀect is very small and
19Once current productive tasks and organizational capital are suﬃciently good substitutes, further
increases in θ are hard to distinguish from increases in the organizational capital share β so I set θ =1 −α
in most simulations, which has the intuitive appeal that the production function is additively separable
so that changes in productivity do not at all aﬀect the productivity of organizational capital.
29despite the very high fraction of workers assigned to organizational tasks (h∗ =0 .5), the
impulse response for hiring is never increasing after the initial jump.
6.2.4 Depreciation rate organizational capital and adjustment costs
Finally, consider the role of the adjustment costs φ and the depreciation rate of organi-
zational capital δ.S i n c eφ and δ aﬀect the shape of the impulse responses as well as the
time scale it is hard to make a meaningful comparison between the impulse responses
for diﬀerent values for φ and δ keeping all other parameters constant. Therefore, I use
the share parameter for organizational capital in production β to make the impulse
responses better comparable. I simulate the model for a range of values for φ and δ,
setting β such that hiring does not jump either up or down immediately after the shock.
This is the case of a perfect jobless recovery, where ˙ N =0immediately after an increase
in productivity. Panel A in table 2 presents the resulting steady state fraction of workers
in current productive activities. Because the shape of the impulse responses for hiring
is the same across simulations, these responses can be conveniently summarized by the
length of the delay after the increase in productivity before hiring reaches its maximum
level and the height of that maximum. Panels B and C in table 2 present these summary
statistics.
Proposition 2 states that in the simple model, given a ﬁxed share of organizational
capital in the production function, there is a lower bound on the adjustment costs
φ and an upper bound on the depreciation rate of organizational capital δ.T h i s i s
no diﬀerent in the full model. For a given value for φ, as the depreciation rate of
organizational capital gets higher, a higher fraction of workers assigned to organizational
tasks is necessary for the model to display persistence in hiring and the duration of the
delay becomes shorter. For a given value of δ, as the adjustment costs decrease, the
duration of the delay becomes shorter as well. In practice, there is also an upper bound
on the adjustment costs. For high φ, the maximum amount of hiring becomes very small
so that the volatility of employment rapidly decreases, and hiring is persistent only if a
large fraction of the workforce are performing organizational tasks in steady state.
For reasonable values of the adjustment costs, the model predicts delays in hiring
from less than three months to over a year if the economy is originally in steady state.
If organizational capital is suﬃciently persistent (δ suﬃciently low), the model predicts
substantial delays in hiring even if the fraction of workers allocated to organizational
tasks is very small.
6.3 Jobless recoveries
Because in response to an increase in productivity hiring starts only gradually, employ-
ment initially does not increase at all or may initially even decrease. In that sense, the
impulse response for employment generated by the model looks like a jobless recovery.
In most past recessions employment remained low for a few months after the trough
date, but after the recessions that ended in March 1991 and November 2001 employ-
ment has been particularly slow to recover. After these recessions, it took 14 and 29
months respectively for employment to return to the level it was at the NBER trough
date. For comparison, on average after the ﬁve recessions in the 1960s, 70s and 80s after
the recession ended, employment reached the level of the previous peak after about 9
30months (Schreft and Singh 2003, Aaronsson, Rissman and Sullivan 2004). The delays in
hiring predicted by the model are of the same order of magnitude as these long jobless
recoveries.
Clearly a theory of jobless recoveries should explain why the the jobless period was
so much longer after the 1991 and 2001 than in earlier recoveries. The organizational
capital model oﬀers an explanation that is at least qualitatively consistent with the data.
The 1991 and 2001 recessions followed two of the three longest booms in the history of
the NBER chronology, 92 and 120 months respectively.20 A c c o r d i n gt ot h em o d e l ,
organizational capital is depleted at the beginning of an expansion and then built up
again as the expansion continues and employment increases. If organizational capital is
very persistent, it would still be below steady state after a relatively short expansion. In
that case the intensive margin of labor adjustment is only available to a limited extent,
and employing more workers is optimal after a short lag. After a long expansion on
the other hand, ﬁrms have been rebuilding their organizational capital stock during the
expansion and there is room to postponse organizational tasks for substantial amounts
of time after the end of the recession.
This explanation is related to, but diﬀerent from the one oﬀered by Koenders and
Rogerson (2004). Consistent with the argument in this paper, Koenders and Rogerson
argue that reorganizations will be postponed when productivity is relatively high. There
are two main diﬀerences. First, in their view reorganizations involve shedding of labor,
whereas in the model in this paper reorganization requires labor. Second, in their model
reorganization is postponed as long as the expansion lasts, whereas in this paper post-
poning organizational tasks is a temporary solution. The prediction of both models is
that jobless recoveries follow long expansions. In the Koenders and Rogerson framework
this is because reorganizations have been postponed for so long that the recession is not
long enough to remove all ineﬃciencies. In the model of this paper, most ineﬃciencies
have been eliminated at the end of a long expansion so that organizational tasks can be
postponed after the recession ends.
7 Conclusions
This paper presents a model in which production requires organizational capital and
analyzes its predictions for employment ﬂuctuations. Organizational capital is accu-
mulated by workers performing organizational tasks. Organizational tasks diﬀer from
regular productive tasks because their eﬀect on production is not immediate but lasts
for a period of time. This provides ﬁrms with a mechanism to intertemporally substi-
tute labor input by postponing organizational tasks when the productivity of regular
productive tasks is relatively high. I label this the intensive margin of labor adjustment.
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁxed adjustment costs in employment, it is optimal to delay em-
ployment adjustments in response to productivity shocks and reallocate workers within
the ﬁrm instead. By using the intensive margin of adjustment, ﬁrms can postpone the
adjustment costs, lowering these costs from a net present value perspective. Unlike in
20Koenders and Rogerson (2004) present evidence that, after detrending the data, employment was
very slow to recover also after the 1970 recession, which followed the third of the three longest expansions
since 1854.
31most models with non-convex adjustment costs, this result carries over to the case of
convex adjustment costs in employment. With convex adjustment costs there is an in-
centive to adjust employment gradually. While employment has not yet reached its new
optimal level in response to a change in productivity, ﬁrms use the intensive margin of
adjustment. As the stock of organizational capital is gradually depleted, the need for
adjusting employment becomes more urgent, so that the highest amount of hiring or
ﬁring occurs a while after productivity changes.
To evaluate the quantitative relevance of this mechanism, I simulated a dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium model with organizational capital and (convex) adjustment
costs in employment. The simulations indicate that even if the fraction of workers (or
the fraction of time spent by each worker) performing organizational tasks is low, the
model generates persistent ﬂuctuations in employment, driven by dynamics for hiring
and ﬁring that are very diﬀerent from standard models. The model not only explains
why employment ﬂuctuations are persistent and why employment lags output over the
business cycle, but it does so in a way that is consistent with evidence that employ-
ment growth is persistent. In response to an increase in productivity, hiring increases
gradually as if there were adjustment costs in the hiring rate instead of in employment.
For this result to go through, the depreciation rate of organizational capital needs to
be suﬃciently low and organizational capital and regular productive tasks need to be
suﬃciently good substitutes so that an increase in productivity increases the relative
productivity of regular productive tasks over organizational tasks.
A Linearized model with convex adjustment costs
Consider the 4-by-4 linear system of diﬀerential equations in (26). For r>0, δ>0,
α>0, w>0 and φ>0 the matrix A has two eigenvalues with positive and two with
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then the eigenvalues are complex. Denote the stable eigenvalues (for which the ﬁrst ± is
am i n u s )b yλ1 and λ2 with Reλ1 < 0 and Reλ2 < 0. The eigenvectors corresponding



























32The stable eigenvectors deﬁne the stable hyperplane and the linearized policy rules for
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To prove proposition 2, substitute the policy rules into (27)
˙ n
N∗ '
2δ (r + δ)[λ1λ2 − r(r + δ)]




and because r>0, δ>0, α>0, w>0, φ>0, N∗ > 0, Reλ1 < 0, Reλ2 < 0 and
ˆ N<0 this implies that ˙ n>0 i fa n do n l yi f 21
λ1λ2 <r(r + δ)
Because the eigenvalues may be complex, this condition cannot be immediately inter-
preted in terms of the model parameters. If λ1 and λ2 are complex then they are complex
conjugates so that λ1λ2 is real, otherwise ˙ n would be complex. First, use the expressions
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Next, take the ﬁrst two terms to the left-hand side, square both sides of the equation












+3 2 δ (r + δ)
αw
φN∗ =0
Notice that Q drops out and because the discriminant is positive this equation always
has real solutions. Of course this equation has two roots for λ1λ2, only one of which is
21Because λ1 and λ2 are complex conjugates with a negative real part, λ1 + λ2 =2 a<0 where
a =R e λ1 =R e λ2 and λ1λ2 = a
2 + b
2 > 0 where b =I m λ1 =I m λ2. Therefore (r − λ1)(r − λ2)=
r
2 − r(λ1 + λ2)+λ1λ2 > 0 so that the denominator is always real and positive.
33the solution. Substituting λ1λ2 = r(r + δ), rearranging and squaring, we get a quadratic
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¶
deﬁnes the only positive candidate lower bound for φ.S i n c ef o r φ → 0, λ1λ2 →∞>
r(r + δ) and for φ →∞ , λ1λ2 =0<r(r + δ) there has to be a positive lower bound
for φ so it must be that the candidate φ is indeed the lower bound, which proves the
proposition in the text.
B The extended RBC model
The recursive formulation of the representative agent’s problem (32) is given by the
following Bellman equation.
ρV (L,N,K,P)=m a x
h,n,c
½





Because the state vector [L,N,K,P]
0 follows a multivariate Itô process deﬁn e db y( 2 ) ,
(22), (29) and (31), the value function is an Itô process as well, and by Itô’s lemma
E [dV ]
dt
= δ [(1 − h)N − L]VL + nVN
+[f (PhN,L,K) − c − δKK]VK − µP logPVP + 1
2σ2P2VPP
where f is the production function for the consumption good as in (30).
The ﬁrst order conditions for consumption c, the fraction of workers in current
productive activities h and hiring n,
VK = u0 (c)
δVL = Pf1VK = u0 (c)Pf1
VN = φn
and the envelope conditions for L, N, K and P are given by,
(ρ + δ)VL = f2VK +
E [dVL]
dt
ρVN = −γ + δ (1 − h)VL + Phf1VK +
E [dVN]
dt
= Pf1VK − γ +
E [dVN]
dt
ρVK =( f3 − δK)VK +
E [dVK]
dt






= δ [(1 − h)N − L]VLX + nVNX
+[f (PhN,L,K) − c − δKK]VKX − µP logPVPX + 1
2σ2P2VPPX
for X = L, N, K and P.
Taking partial derivatives of the ﬁrst order conditions to obtain the cross-partials of
the value function and substituting into the envelope conditions, these conditions can
be combined to get a system of four partial diﬀerential equations in the policy rules for
c, h, n and VP as functions of the state variables K, L, N and P.
















































































































































One way to solve for the linearized policy rules, is to linearize these partial diﬀeren-
tial equations and to substitute linear solutions for the policy rules with undetermined
coeﬃcients. Because the equations have to be identically satisﬁed for all values of the
state variables, this gives a (linear) system of 16 equations which can be (numerically)
solved for the 16 coeﬃcients of the policy rules. It is simpler however, to use certainty
equivalence.
Because in the linearized model the policy rules are linear, VLPP = VNPP = VKPP =
VPPP =0 . Therefore, the terms involving the standard deviation σ of the innovations
in logP drop out of ﬁrst three partial diﬀerential equations. The fourth equation deter-
mines the policy rule for VP and does depend on σ. But because the ﬁrst three equations
35are independent of VP, the linearized policy rules for h, n and c do not depend on the
degree of uncertainty σ. In this sense the model is equivalent to a deterministic model
with σ =0 . As usual, certainty equivalence arises because of the linearization. Because
of certainty equivalence, we can solve for the linearized policy rules of the deterministic
model, and use these to simulate the stochastic model.
Using the ﬁrst order condition to calculate E [dVL]/dt = ˙ VL, E [dVN]/dt = ˙ VN and
E [dVK]/dt = ˙ VK and substituting into the envelope conditions, with σ =0we get four































= ρ + δ − δ
f2
Pf1
˙ n = ρn −






= ρ + δK − f3
˙ VP
VP
= ρ + µ + µlogP −
u0hNf1
VP
Combined with the laws of motion for organizational capital (2), employment (22),
physical capital (29), and productivity ˙ P = −µP logP from (31) with σ =0 ,t h e s e
equations form a system of 8 ordinary diﬀerential equations in the variables L, h, N, n,
K, c, P and VP.
The steady state is found by setting ˙ L = ˙ h = ˙ N = ˙ n = ˙ K = ˙ c = ˙ P = ˙ VP =0and is
given by ¯ L =
¡
1 − ¯ h
¢ ¯ N, ¯ n =0 , ¯ P =1 , ¯ c = f
¡ ¯ P¯ h ¯ N,¯ L, ¯ K
¢
− δK ¯ K and
(ρ + δ)Pf1
¡ ¯ P¯ h ¯ N,¯ L, ¯ K
¢
= δf2
¡ ¯ P¯ h ¯ N,¯ L, ¯ K
¢
u0 (¯ c)Pf1




¡ ¯ P¯ h ¯ N,¯ L, ¯ K
¢
= ρ + δK
Finally, (ρ + µ) ¯ VP = ¯ h ¯ Nu0 (¯ c)f1
¡ ¯ P¯ h ¯ N,¯ L, ¯ K
¢
.
The (log)linearized system is of the form ˙ X = AX,w i t hX =[ˆ L,ˆ h, ˆ N,ˆ n, ˆ K,ˆ c, ˆ P,ˆ V 0
P]0
where a hat over a variable denotes a relative deviation from its (deterministic) steady




,e x c e p tf o rˆ n, which is hiring as a fraction of steady state
employment, ˆ n = n/ ¯ N. The linearized policy rules are given by the stable eigenvectors
of the matrix A. Given the policy rules, we can simulate the system using the linearized
laws of motion for the state variables for any initial value for the state. Because the
policy rules nor the laws of motion for the state variables depend on the degree of
uncertainty σ, neither directly nor through VP, simulating the linear system for the
deterministic model gives impulse responses for the stochastic model for all observable
variables because E [dX]=AXdt for all rows except the one for ˆ VP.
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39Table 1. Business cycle statistics: data and model simulations
Panel A. Business cycle statistics
sd
stst h yciN Y / N AyciN Y / N AciN Y / N A
Data (KR 1999) 1 1.81 0.74 2.93 0.99 0.56 0.54 0.84 0.80 0.87 0.88 0.74 0.74 0.88 0.80 0.88 0.55 0.78
Standard RBC model (KR 1999) 1 1.42 0.42 3.50 0.51 0.52 0.66 0.72 0.80 0.70 0.70 0.77 0.71 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.00
 - with linear utility over leisure 1 1.76 0.36 3.18 0.69 0.36 0.54 0.72 0.81 0.71 0.70 0.81 0.72 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.91 1.00
Adjustment costs 2 1 1.60 0.37 3.14 0.71 0.45 0.59 0.85 0.79 0.84 0.71 0.44 0.72 0.91 0.99 0.91 0.77 0.94
phi =  5 1 1.53 0.39 3.09 0.66 0.49 0.62 0.87 0.80 0.88 0.83 0.53 0.73 0.92 0.99 0.91 0.82 0.94
10 1 1.43 0.40 3.03 0.62 0.53 0.66 0.87 0.79 0.89 0.88 0.55 0.72 0.93 0.99 0.89 0.85 0.94
Organizational capital 0.1 0.7 1.27 0.34 3.25 0.52 0.87 0.74 0.56 0.80 0.50 0.88 0.31 0.72 0.87 0.99 0.50 0.86 0.98
0.01 0.988 1.62 0.37 3.14 0.64 0.74 0.58 0.70 0.80 0.68 0.88 0.31 0.71 0.92 0.99 0.68 0.77 1.00
phi = 2, delta =  0.005 0.995 1.65 0.37 3.13 0.65 0.73 0.57 0.72 0.80 0.70 0.88 0.32 0.72 0.92 0.99 0.69 0.76 1.00
0.002 0.9986 1.67 0.37 3.13 0.68 0.71 0.57 0.73 0.81 0.71 0.88 0.32 0.73 0.92 0.99 0.70 0.74 1.00
0.1 0.87 1.43 0.37 3.14 0.58 0.78 0.66 0.62 0.80 0.55 0.88 0.20 0.72 0.91 0.99 0.63 0.81 0.98
0.01 0.995 1.55 0.39 3.06 0.65 0.70 0.61 0.73 0.80 0.71 0.88 0.28 0.72 0.93 0.99 0.72 0.77 0.99
phi = 5, delta = 0.005 0.9985 1.54 0.39 3.05 0.67 0.68 0.61 0.74 0.79 0.73 0.88 0.27 0.72 0.94 0.99 0.74 0.75 0.99
0.002 0.9995 1.58 0.38 3.07 0.67 0.68 0.61 0.75 0.80 0.74 0.88 0.30 0.72 0.94 0.99 0.73 0.74 0.99
relative sd autocorrelation correlation with output
All variables in logaritms. Simulated moments are based on 2,500 years of simulated data (10,000 quarters). Model parameters: η =1
(logaritmic utility over consumption), α =1 /3, δK =0 .1 per annum, µ =0 .021 and σ =0 .0088 per quarter. For the standard RBC model
(second row): r =6 .5% per annum, ¯ N =0 .2 so that γ =4 .19;o t h e rr o w s :r =4 %per annum, ¯ N =0 .95 so that γ =0 .92. All simulations
were detrended with the HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter of 1600. The moments in the ﬁrst row are calculated from actual data for the
US 1953:1-1996-4 and were taken from King and Rebelo (1999).
40Panel B. Employment ﬂuctuations
stst h r e l  s d - 6 - 5 - 4 - 3 - 2 - 10123456
Data (SW 1999) 0.84 0.07 0.26 0.49 0.72 0.89 0.92 0.81 0.57 0.24 -0.07 -0.31 -0.44 -0.49
Standard RBC model (KR 1999) 1 0.51 -0.24 -0.16 -0.04 0.12 0.33 0.61 0.97 0.74 0.54 0.38 0.25 0.14 0.05
 - with linear utility over leisure 1 0.69 -0.24 -0.15 -0.03 0.15 0.36 0.63 0.98 0.74 0.55 0.38 0.23 0.11 0.01
Adjustment costs 2 1 0.71 -0.23 -0.12 0.05 0.27 0.55 0.89 0.91 0.68 0.47 0.29 0.14 0.02 -0.07
phi =  5 1 0.66 -0.20 -0.04 0.17 0.43 0.72 0.95 0.91 0.73 0.52 0.33 0.16 0.03 -0.08
10 1 0.62 -0.11 0.07 0.30 0.56 0.81 0.97 0.89 0.72 0.54 0.35 0.19 0.05 -0.06
Organizational capital 0.1 0.7 0.52 -0.07 0.14 0.43 0.72 0.86 0.74 0.50 0.36 0.26 0.15 0.06 -0.03 -0.10
0.01 0.988 0.64 -0.15 0.05 0.32 0.61 0.84 0.90 0.68 0.50 0.36 0.23 0.11 0.02 -0.06
phi = 2, delta =  0.005 0.995 0.65 -0.16 0.06 0.33 0.62 0.85 0.90 0.69 0.51 0.36 0.22 0.11 0.01 -0.08
0.002 0.9986 0.68 -0.17 0.04 0.31 0.60 0.84 0.91 0.70 0.52 0.37 0.23 0.11 0.01 -0.07
(phi = 5) 0.1 0.87 0.58 -0.10 0.08 0.33 0.62 0.84 0.86 0.63 0.51 0.38 0.24 0.11 0.00 -0.09
0.01 0.995 0.65 -0.12 0.07 0.32 0.60 0.83 0.91 0.72 0.57 0.43 0.30 0.18 0.07 -0.02
phi = 5, delta = 0.005 0.9985 0.67 -0.16 0.03 0.29 0.58 0.83 0.92 0.74 0.59 0.44 0.29 0.15 0.03 -0.07
0.002 0.9995 0.67 -0.16 0.05 0.31 0.59 0.83 0.92 0.73 0.58 0.42 0.27 0.13 0.01 -0.09
cross-autocorrelations with output at t + s, where s = 
The moments in the ﬁrst row are calculated from actual data for the US 1953:1-1996-4 and were taken from Stock and Watson (1999), who
detrended the data with a bandpass ﬁlter that passes cyclical ﬂuctuations with periodicities between 6 quarters and 8 years. Other notes:
see under panel A.
41Table 2. Model simulations for diﬀerent values of φ and δ
Panel A. Value for h∗ such that n =0immediately after shock
d e l t a  = 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 5125 1 0 2 0
0.1 0.929 0.908 0.871 0.833 0.783 0.695 0.610 0.505
0.05 0.959 0.947 0.927 0.908 0.883 0.840 0.800 0.751
0.02 0.979 0.974 0.965 0.957 0.946 0.929 0.913 0.894
0.01 0.988 0.985 0.980 0.975 0.970 0.961 0.953 0.944
0.005 0.993 0.992 0.989 0.986 0.983 0.979 0.975 0.970
0.002 0.997 0.996 0.995 0.994 0.993 0.991 0.989 0.987
0.001 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.995 0.994 0.993
adjustment costs, phi =
Panel B. Time at which hiring is highest (in months)
d e l t a  = 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 5125 1 0 2 0
0 . 112233466
0 . 0 522334678
0 . 0 22334578 1 0
0 . 0 1234568 1 0 1 2
0 . 0 0 5345679 1 1 1 3
0 . 0 0 234568 1 0 1 2 1 5
0 . 0 0 134678 1 1 1 3 1 6
adjustment costs, phi =
Panel C. Peakvalue of hiring (times 10−3 per month)
d e l t a  = 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 5125 1 0 2 0
0.1 1.64 1.23 0.82 0.59 0.41 0.24 0.15 0.08
0.05 1.37 1.04 0.71 0.52 0.38 0.24 0.16 0.11
0.02 1.06 0.81 0.56 0.42 0.31 0.20 0.14 0.10
0.01 0.88 0.67 0.46 0.35 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.08
0.005 0.75 0.57 0.39 0.29 0.22 0.14 0.10 0.07
0.002 0.64 0.48 0.33 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.06
0.001 0.59 0.45 0.31 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.05
adjustment costs, phi =
Values for h∗ in panel A of the table. Other parameters: α =1 /3, δK = 10% per annum,
r =4 %per annum, ¯ N =0 .95, θ =1− α (additively separable production function).
For all simulations presented, n =0immediately after the increase in productivity.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 1% permanent increase in productivity in a standard
RBC model (solid lines) and an RBC model with convex adjustment costs in employment
(dashed lines). Time on horizontal axis in months. Model parameters: α =1 /3, δK =
10% per annum, r =4 %per annum, ¯ N =0 .95, TFP normalized such that ¯ Y =1 ,
θ =1− α (additively separable production function), φ =0and 10.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a 1% permanent increase in productivity in an RBC
model extended with convex adjustment costs in employment and organizational capital.
Time on horizontal axis in months. Model parameters: α =1 /3, δK = 10% per annum,
r =4 %per annum, ¯ N =0 .95, TFP normalized such that ¯ Y =1 , θ =1− α (additively
separable production function), φ =1 0 , ¯ h =0 .92 and δ =0 .02.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a 1% permanent increase in productivity in an RBC
model extended with convex adjustment costs in employment and organizational cap-
ital, for diﬀerent values of the share of organizational capital in production. Time on
horizontal axis in months. Model parameters: α =1 /3, δK = 10% per annum, r =4 %
per annum, ¯ N =0 .95, TFP normalized such that ¯ Y =1 , θ =1−α (additively separable
production function), φ =1 0 , δ =0 .02 and ¯ h =0 .9 (dashed), 0.92 (solid) and 0.95
(dotted).
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a 1% increase in productivity in an RBC model extended
with convex adjustment costs in employment and organizational capital, for diﬀerent
values of the persistence parameter for productivity µ. Time on horizontal axis in
months. Model parameters: α =1 /3, δK = 10% per annum, r =4 %per annum,
¯ N =0 .95, TFP normalized such that ¯ Y =1 , θ =0(Cobb-Douglas production function),
φ =1 0 , ¯ h =0 .5, δ =0 .02 and µ =0(dark solid), 0.015 (dashed), 0.045 (dotted), 0.135
(dash-dot) and 0.4 (light solid) per quarter.
46